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Running Head: Dissonance and Self-Protective Distortions
Abstract
Context
When errors occur in clinical settings, it is important that they are recognized without 
defensiveness so that prompt corrective action can be taken and learning can occur. Cognitive 
dissonance—the uncomfortable tension we experience when we hold two or more 
inconsistent beliefs—can hinder our ability to respond optimally to error. 
Aim
The aim of this paper is to describe the effects of cognitive dissonance, a construct developed 
and tested in social psychology. We discuss the circumstances under which dissonance is 
most likely to occur, provide examples of how it may influence clinical practice, discuss 
potential remedies and suggest future research to test these remedies in the clinical context. 
Methods
We apply research on cognitive dissonance from social psychology to clinical settings. The 
factors that make dissonance most likely to occur are examined. We illustrate the power of 
cognitive dissonance through two medical examples: one from history and one that is 
ongoing. Finally, we explore moderators at various stages of the dissonance process to 
identify potential remedies.  
Results
We show that there is great opportunity for cognitive dissonance to distort judgments, delay 
optimal responses and hinder learning in clinical settings. We present a model of the phases 
of cognitive dissonance, and suggestions for preventing dissonance, reducing the distortions 
that can arise from dissonance and inhibiting dissonance-induced escalation of commitment.
Conclusion
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Cognitive dissonance has been studied for decades in social psychology but has not had much 
influence on medical education research. We argue that the construct of cognitive dissonance 
is very relevant to the clinical context and to medical education. Dissonance has the potential 
to interfere with learning, to hinder coping effectively with error, and to make accepting 
change difficult. Fortunately, there is the potential to reduce the negative impact of cognitive 
dissonance in clinical practice.
Introduction
Imagine a student who thought they did very well on their first-year exams but receives poor 
scores. Consider an intern who was praised by a reputable specialist during morning rounds 
for making an excellent diagnosis, but then views the results of a scan indicating the 
diagnosis is incorrect. Or a senior surgeon who reads a new study suggesting that a surgical 
procedure they often perform has been found to not have beneficial patient outcomes.
These situations are all likely to produce what social psychologists refer to as cognitive 
dissonance: the uncomfortable tension we experience when we hold two or more inconsistent 
beliefs, or our behavior is inconsistent with our beliefs.1 Our first-year medical student is 
likely to believe that they are intelligent, have strong academic abilities and prepared well for 
the exam. These beliefs are discrepant with the knowledge that the exam performance was 
poor. The intern might believe they were very astute in their diagnostic abilities, which is 
inconsistent with the scan findings that the diagnosis was erroneous. The senior surgeon, who 
feels very proficient in their chosen procedure and believes that their interventions have 
brought relief to hundreds of patients, is now faced with information that suggests patients 
have been subjected to unnecessary suffering. 
In 1957, Leon Festinger published his theory of cognitive dissonance,1 generating hundreds 
of studies since that time. Cognitive dissonance has been viewed as one of the most 
influential theories in social psychology.2,3 Decades of research tells us that when we 
experience dissonance, a negative emotional response is generated,4 and we are strongly 
motivated to remove this source of distress.5  There are many avenues to reducing the 
discomfort of dissonance, including self-justification, motivated reasoning and defensive 
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selective perception.6 Unfortunately, these processes can distort our thinking, propel us to 
blame others for our own errors, lead to the escalation of commitment to an incorrect course 
of action, and inhibit our ability to learn from our mistakes.7,8 
While little research on cognitive dissonance has been conducted in the clinical setting, work 
in other domains suggests that dissonance is likely to be prominent in medicine. Having 
responsibility for a decision and making decisions where there are potentially negative 
consequences for getting it wrong are characteristics of many medical decisions, and studies 
find that these factors can make dissonance more intense.9,10
When Dissonance is Most Likely to Occur
Research finds that there are particular circumstances in which cognitive dissonance is most 
likely to occur. Those most relevant to medical practice are when we make a decision, or 
when we encounter information or do something that contradicts our beliefs.3 In all of these 
cases we are vulnerable to a threat to our self-esteem. If we make the wrong decision, we 
might feel stupid, if we encounter information that suggest we are wrong, we may feel that 
our judgment is poor, and if we do something that goes against our beliefs, we might feel 
hypocritical or even immoral. Studies find that at the crux of dissonance is the threat to a 
sense of ourselves as good, competent people. We will defend mightily against this threat to 
our identity by performing all sorts of mental gymnastics to avoid or reduce dissonance and 
to protect our self-esteem.11,12 
Making a Decision
When we make a decision, we often consider the pros and cons of different options. Once we 
have chosen an alternative, the negatives of the option we chose and the positives of the 
foregone alternatives could cause us dissonance. Thus, we will tend to ignore or downplay 
the negatives of our chosen option, enhance our view of its positives, and do the opposite for 
the non-chosen options. This phenomenon is known as a “dissonance spread” because the 
gap between a chosen and forgone option becomes wider after we make the choice.13,14
When a doctor chooses among a set of treatment options, they may see the chosen treatment 
path as more optimal, and the other options as less optimal after the decision has been made. 
Similarly, a favored treatment path may come to be seen as clearly and substantially the best 
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option over time, simply because it has been chosen numerous times in the past, and not 
because the evidence suggests that it is truly the best option. This makes it less likely that the 
doctor will change their mind about the best treatment, even when a revision of this judgment 
might be prudent. In fact, the desire to reduce dissonance can lead to the escalation of 
commitment, where the doctor becomes even more committed to their chosen course of 
action.15 
Encountering Information Contradictory to Beliefs
When we learn something new that is in opposition to already existing beliefs, we may 
experience dissonance. To reduce this dissonance, we can change our initial belief, but if that 
belief is deeply held, we will find other alternatives. A tool for relieving dissonance is the 
confirmatory bias, which leads us to seek information that fits what we expect or desire, 
weight confirming information more heavily than disconfirming information, remember 
confirmatory information better, and interpret ambiguous information as being supportive of 
our beliefs and wishes.16,17 
 
When a doctor feels certain of a diagnosis, dissonance might be induced by information that 
emerges suggesting the diagnosis is incorrect. To reduce this dissonance, the doctor might 
engage in the confirmatory bias by seeking out and believing information that supports their 
initial diagnosis, discounting the validity of information not supporting the diagnosis, or by 
interpreting ambiguous information, such as unclear test results, as consistent with the 
diagnosis.18 In this way, our need to protect ourselves in the face of dissonance can result in 
the distortion of pertinent critical information. 
Actions That Contradict Beliefs
Dissonance is aroused when our actions and beliefs are inconsistent. To reduce this 
dissonance, we will engage in self-justification by generating thoughts and arguments that 
rationalize our behavior.19 For example, a junior doctor who administers the wrong dosage of 
a medication will likely experience dissonance because this behavior is inconsistent with the 
desired self-perception of a careful and caring doctor. If possible, they are likely to justify 
their actions by noting they were following a senior doctor’s sloppily written medication 
order, or that there were too many patients to attend to in too short a time. The self-serving 
bias—our tendency to take personal credit when things go well, but to blame outside factors 
when things go poorly—is a convenient tool for reducing dissonance.20 Research finds that 
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blaming outside factors is a typical response to making a medical error. For example, trainees 
commonly justify errors, redefine them as non-mistakes, or blame external factors such as 
colleagues, patients or extenuating circumstances.21 All of these would be handy dissonance 
reduction strategies.
Cognitive Dissonance in Medicine: Two Examples
We present two examples of how cognitive dissonance affects medical judgment. In both 
cases, new scientific knowledge confronts existing beliefs and behaviors. This generates 
cognitive dissonance and leads to self-justification processes that create a powerful barrier to 
medical progress, perpetuating unhelpful—even dangerous—practices. The first example 
comes from history, and the second is contemporary.
Isnac Semmelweis and the Prevention of Puerperal Fever
Cognitive dissonance is a likely culprit in resistance to innovation over the course of medical 
history. While the role of hand hygiene in the prevention of infection has been known for 
over 150 years, compliance rates with handwashing in modern hospitals is disturbingly low.22 
While time pressures and forgetting may contribute to this lack of compliance, perhaps 
dissonance also plays a role.
The impact of dissonance is clear to see in early attempts to change clinical hygiene habits. In 
the mid 19th century, Isnac Semmelweis, an obstetrician of Vienna General Hospital, 
discovered that unclean hands contributed significantly to the occurrence of puerperal 
(childbed) fever in women who had recently given birth. Semmelweis believed that the 
practice of doing autopsies on victims of childbed fever, and then treating patients in labor 
just after, was causing the spread of the disease. He insisted that clinicians entering his ward 
scrub their hands with a chlorine solution, and the incidence of the disease dropped 
dramatically.23 
Semmelweis’ sanitation practices met a great deal of resistance. Even in his own ward, 
Semmelweis faced vigorous opposition to his theory, with colleagues refusing to believe that 
their own hands had brought death to so many patients. Some of this resistance was likely 
due to cultural norms and the importance of the hierarchy in medicine, but there are also clear 
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signs that dissonance was operating. Semmelweis’ most ardent opponent was his supervisor, 
Johann Klein, who had instituted the practice of morning autopsies. The senior doctor refused 
to believe that young Semmelweis’ views had merit. In his telling of this history, Nuland23 
wrote of Klein:
And being human, he was having difficulty facing the increasing evidence that 
Semmelweis had discovered something truly valuable that might save many 
lives, something that his own refusal to change an outmoded viewpoint had 
prevented him from seeing. And if that something was as true as the evidence 
was every passing month confirming it to be, then Klein himself had been the 
purveyor of death for thousands of women whose lives were lost because of the 
methods he had instituted. …he was, after all, a physician and deeply affected 
by the carnage on the obstetric wards. Like many others, he could not face his 
own culpability. It was easier on the conscience if he did not remove his dark 
spectacles and take the cotton wool from his ears; this was the time to entrench 
his position… (p.109).
Nuland has described a profound example of cognitive dissonance with all of the right 
precipitating conditions: new beliefs were conflicting with long-held ideas and behaviors, the 
decisions Klein made were unequivocally under his control and clearly his own 
responsibility, and the consequences of his actions—if Semmelweis is right—were horrific. 
We can see why he clung so firmly to his views, arriving at numerous alternative 
explanations for the high rates of puerperal fever before handwashing began: an epidemic in 
the city, poor conditions of ward walls, the presence of “mother’s milk” in the abdomen, and 
even contact with foreign medical students. When infection rates dropped after the 
introduction of hand hygiene, Klein attributed the change to a new ventilation system.23 The 
cognitive distortions he employed were a testament to his need to avoid the dissonance that 
would result from acknowledging the truth.
While Klein’s dissonance-avoiding arguments were not helpful to his patients, they were 
likely what allowed him to sleep at night and get out of bed the next morning. Another doctor 
in Semmelweis’ sphere was not so fortunate. Gustav Michaelis was one of the first to 
institute handwashing practices in response to the new evidence coming from Vienna. The 
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results in his own clinic were so profound, and his feelings of guilt so deep, that the already 
melancholy Michaelis committed suicide in 1848.24 
Somewhere between the reactions of Klein and Michaelis lies a healthy response to cognitive 
dissonance—one that should be encouraged in medical training. We will discuss this after 
presenting a modern example of how dissonance may be underlying the persistence of 
suboptimal practices in medicine.
The Perseverance of Arthroscopic Surgery
The application of arthroscopic surgery for patients with osteoarthritis of the knee is the most 
common ambulatory orthopedic procedure in the USA and has been routine practice for over 
two decades.25 The nature of this surgery has included debridement (removal of ragged 
cartilage) and lavage (flushing out of the joint). This practice has been widespread, but 
evidence of its efficacy has been lacking.26-28 In 2002, Moseley and colleagues published a 
randomized sham-controlled study that demonstrated that neither the debridement nor lavage 
procedures resulted in a significant effect on knee-specific pain after 12 months.26 
Imagine the response to this study by a surgeon who has practiced these procedures for many 
years. These skills were difficult to obtain and required years of training. The surgeon has 
conducted hundreds of these procedures, but now learns from a newly published article that 
instead of helping patients, patients may have been exposed to unnecessary risk and pain. 
Will this surgeon think, “Well, I guess I need to find a new way to treat osteoarthritis of the 
knee!”? For a typical member of the human species, this is unlikely. Dissonance is stronger 
with greater investment of time and effort.3 Thus, truly acknowledging the new research is 
likely to cause strong dissonance. Instead the surgeon will likely leap into a dissonance 
reduction process to eliminate negative emotional arousal.
Dissonance reduction usually proceeds along the path of least resistance,29 and our surgeon 
has many potential paths to take. Among other options, they can judge the research as poorly 
conducted, the journal as having poor standards for publication, or the sample utilized in the 
study as not relevant to their own practice. Because the paper is published in the New 
England Journal of Medicine, rationalizing that the paper appeared in a weak journal is not 
an option. Optimal research design, however, is more open to interpretation, as is the correct 
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recruitment of a patient sample. In fact, the Moseley study was criticized for its male patient 
bias and single surgeon approach and was, to some extent, ignored as a consequence.30 
The surgeon may also employ confirmatory bias to combat dissonance by recalling many 
patients who improved after the procedure (which does produce a substantial placebo effect 
as demonstrated in the sham control conditions of the Moseley study26). They may also recall 
patients who did not improve but blame their lack of progress on poor compliance with 
physical therapy. All of these justifications may allow the surgeon to disregard the new 
findings and continue on with practice as usual. But a more difficult hurdle will be faced in 
six years’ time when Kirkley and colleagues publish a similar sham-controlled study with a 
more gender balanced population that again demonstrates no benefit to the patient.27 In a 
testament to the Herculean power of dissonance, the surgeon may continue using the 
procedure even after the publication of the 2012 study by Bohensky and colleagues that 
demonstrated little if any effect of arthroscopy in a national context.28 They continue even 
after subsequent studies have further confirmed these results. Psychologists have found that 
people can become entrapped in continuing down a suboptimal previously chosen path, 
escalating their commitment to a choice even in the face of evidence that outcomes are 
poor.31 This may explain why there has been only a slow reduction in the practice of 
arthroscopic surgery for patients with osteoarthritis of the knee, and the procedure continues 
to be used by many orthopedic surgeons today.32 
Both of our examples demonstrate how medical decision making can be influenced by the 
need to reduce cognitive dissonance, to the detriment of patients and to progress in medicine. 
As outlined above, dissonance can contribute to many other problems in patient care as well. 
In medical education, dissonance could cause students to defend against negative feedback 
and educators to be slow to acknowledge that favorite teaching methodologies might not be 
state-of-the-art. Given the powerful effects of dissonance on our judgments, it is worthwhile 
to consider how medical training might provide doctors with tools for dealing with 
dissonance without resorting to elaborate distortions. 
Potential Remedies for Cognitive Dissonance
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
While remedies for cognitive dissonance have not yet been tested in the clinical context, there 
has been an abundance of research in other settings on the factors that can reduce the 
experience of dissonance and its accompanying distortions. We set these out here, with 
suggestions for applying these findings to medicine and medical education, as well as 
recommendations for research into the robustness of these possible remedies within clinical 
settings.
At the start, it is helpful to understand that dissonance plays out in stages.19 We have broken 
down the dissonance process in Figure 1, with relevant moderators and potential medical 
education interventions identified.
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Figure 1: Phases of Dissonance, Moderators and Possible Interventions 
Preventing Dissonance: The Importance of Individual Choice
Early research established that cognitive dissonance only occurs when a person believes their 
decisions and actions are freely chosen.33 This finding has been replicated many times 
since,14 with only one study in medicine, which found  that trainees experienced more 
dissonance about an incorrect decision to admit or discharge an ER patient when the trainee 
chose the option compared to when a senior doctor made the decision.9 While more research 
needs to be done in the clinical context, this research suggests that reduced choice in a 
diagnostic decision reduces the likelihood of dissonance occurring. For example, if there is an 
adverse patient event when a trainee is following an established checklist or diagnostic 
algorithm, one would expect that dissonance would be less likely to occur. By extension, 
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pointing out the situational constraints on a trainee’s judgment (for example, that key 
symptoms had not yet appeared or that time constraints required a best guess, provisional 
opinion) might be helpful in preventing or reducing the experience of dissonance so that 
learning can be optimized. For the surgeon confronting research suggesting that a favored 
procedure is not efficacious, a reminder that the decision to use that procedure in the past was 
based on the best available evidence at the time—that is, they really didn’t have much 
choice—could be helpful. 
Preventing the Self-Justifications and Distortions Arising from Dissonance
Once dissonance is experienced, people are motivated to reduce the dissonance, and self-
justification and distortion are often-used tools for doing so. Research points to several 
factors that can reduce this rationalization process. For example, ample research finds that 
when the arousal caused by dissonance is attributed to another source (such as an anxiety- 
inducing medication they have taken), the effects of dissonance are reduced.14  Other research 
suggests that a dissonant behavior must lead to a foreseeable aversive consequence for 
distortions to occur.34 For the sake of brevity, we will focus here on self-affirmation, a key 
moderator of the effects of dissonance, and one in which potential interventions through 
medical education are easily applicable.
At the heart of the experience of cognitive dissonance is a threat to one’s identity or self-
esteem. Distortions that occur in the wake of dissonance represent an attempt to reduce this 
threat.7,35 But these distortions are not the only route to identity repair: research has shown 
that when one encounters an identity threat (such as that caused by dissonance), the threat can 
be accepted without distortion by affirming some other important quality of the self that 
reinforces self-esteem.36,37 A series of studies have examined the role of self-affirmation in 
response to cognitive dissonance. For example, in one study students ranked 10 record CDs 
and then chose to receive either their 5th or 6th ranked choice. The participants—some of 
whom had identified science as their most important value, and others who had identified 
science as an unimportant domain—were then given a white lab coat to wear. A typical 
dissonance distortion finding would be that the chosen CD would be ranked higher and the 
forgone option ranked lower than they had been before the choice was made. This was the 
case for all of the groups, except for the science-oriented students wearing the white lab coat. 
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The opportunity to affirm a treasured aspect of the self replaced the need to reduce 
dissonance through distortion.38 
Research shows that when dissonance is experienced, people may already be searching for an 
opportunity to self-affirm by focusing on core values.39 This represents a potential 
opportunity for medical educators to provide feedback about a mistake that includes 
identification of an important value that the student is displaying in their work. By providing 
this affirmation, self-justifications are less likely to occur, and learning can be optimized. But 
we need to be careful about which value we emphasize: research finds that highlighting a 
value that is strongly related to the dissonant behavior can backfire, and in fact increase 
justification and defensiveness.6,40 For example, if a trainee made a mistake that could have 
harmed a patient, highlighting the trainee’s value of protecting patient safety may actually 
increase cognitive dissonance. However, citing the trainee’s value of learning, such as by 
saying “I’ve noticed that you put a lot of effort into learning and taking every opportunity to 
improve the way you practice,” may affirm the trainee’s identity and increase receptiveness 
to feedback. Because these types of interventions have not been tested in the clinical setting, 
future research can examine the efficacy of specific forms of identity-affirming feedback.   
Reducing the Self-Justifications and Distortions Arising from Dissonance
Self-justifications are often achieved through cognitive biases, such as the confirmatory bias 
and self-serving attributions, two key tools that reduce the aversive emotions of dissonance.11 
A full discussion of remedies for cognitive biases and the debate around the effectiveness of 
these remedies in medical education41 is beyond the scope of this paper. But some research 
does suggest promising avenues, particularly when remedies are specific rather than general 
admonishments to be more thoughtful or careful in reasoning. For example, the confirmatory 
bias is found to be reduced in criminal investigations by considering why a hypothesis might 
be wrong42 and similarly, bias in clinical diagnoses are reduced by using the “consider the 
opposite” technique.43 Clearly there is much more work to be done in understanding the 
effects of bias and remedy training in medical education. A valuable potential outcome of this 
endeavor is the narrowing of possible avenues for the justifications and distortions that can 
arise from dissonance.
Making Escalation of Commitment More Difficult
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A final opportunity to intervene in the dissonance process depicted in Figure 1 is to prevent 
or stop the escalation of commitment that can result from self-justification. Research suggests 
that reducing the sunk-cost bias (the tendency to make future decisions based on past 
investments) can reduce escalation of commitment,19 and other research suggests that the 
sunk cost bias can be reduced through education about how to focus only on future costs and 
benefits in decision-making.44
But once a doctor has escalated their commitment to a treatment method or surgical 
procedure, personal change can be difficult to achieve, and organizational mechanisms might 
be necessary. Hospitals can design “trip wires” into their processes, whereby decisions are 
made ahead of time about the information and evidence needed to end a given practice.45 A 
critical aspect of preventing escalation of commitment is that someone other than the person 
responsible for the original decision take responsibility for deciding about the continuation of 
a practice.46 Thus, the surgeon who continues to believe in the efficacy of arthroscopic 
surgery is not the best person to decide whether to continue the practice. Thus, the regulatory 
and funding environment may be critical in changing the behavior of practitioners. Health 
systems are increasingly applying the principles of “value-based” care in which efficacy, 
adverse events and cost are considered in the context of a specific intervention.47 
Jurisdictions vary in their approach to application of value-based care, but the withdrawal or 
reduction of funding for specific procedures may have the strongest effect on practice.48   
Modeling a Healthy Response to Mistakes
The hidden curriculum in medical training communicates powerful messages to students and 
shapes their behavior and beliefs. Pipel et al. have characterized this process as one that 
“denies uncertainty, de-legitimizes error, and conveys magical notions of absolute 
knowledge”. 49 Further, this learning can lead to denial and blaming others,21   
rationalizations akin to those found in response to the experience of dissonance. Consistent 
with recent trends to more openly discuss error as part of medical training,50,51 and calls to 
make hidden curriculum messages more conducive to desired professional behavior,52 
perhaps modeling a healthy response to dissonance-inducing situations can also play a 
constructive role in improving clinical culture. A study of medical student perceptions of 
senior doctor responses to error showed that students admired and wanted to emulate 
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
supervisors who were honest and open about errors. 53 As medical educators, we can teach 
students about cognitive dissonance and then model an openness to errors and setbacks, 
rather than display defensiveness. We can discuss our own struggles in coming to grips with 
a diagnostic error, a sub-optimally performed procedure, or news that a favored treatment 
approach is now outdated. One approach is to take this advice from Tavris and Aronson11 and 
say to ourselves “When I, a decent, smart person make a mistake, I remain a decent, smart 
person and the mistake remains a mistake. Now how do I remedy what I did?” Saying this 
aloud to our students may help them develop an enlightened approach to coping with error.
Conclusion
Cognitive dissonance can cause self-protective distortions in our judgments leading to 
diagnostic errors, resistance to acknowledging and taking responsibility for mistakes, 
persistence with ineffective treatments, and defensiveness in response to negative feedback. 
Medical decisions are difficult, complex, and evolving, and procedures can be arduous and 
unpredictable. No one can expect a 100% success rate. But we can develop the ability to 
recognize and acknowledge mistakes quickly and honestly, and we can continue to change 
the medical culture so that openness to error becomes the norm. 
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